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Temporary stabilisation: Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal
Szymon Kardaś, Wojciech Konończuk
A five-year contract concerning Russian gas transit via Ukraine was signed after four days of nego-
tiations on 30 December 2019. The previous contract expired on 1 January 2020. The EU-brokered 
talks between Moscow and Kyiv preceding the deal lasted many months and ended in the signing 
of a political protocol on 20 December which defined the terms of a package agreement. Gazprom 
has been obliged under the new transit contract to transport 65 bcm of gas in the first year and 
40 bcm in the next years based on the ship-or-pay formula. Four other documents were also signed: 
(1) an agreement between Naftogaz and Gazprom waiving counterclaims linked to the gas contracts 
of 2009; (2) an interconnection agreement between Gazprom and a company named Operator of the 
Gas Transmission System of Ukraine (OGTSU); (3) a settlement between Gazprom and the Ministry of 
Justice of Ukraine; (4) a transport agreement between Naftogaz and OGTSU. The Russian company 
had to pay US$2.92 billion in damages under the Stockholm Arbitration Court’s ruling before the 
documents could be signed; it did this on 27 December. 
Although the exact wording of the agreements has not been revealed to the general public, their 
key provisions are known because they were included in the protocol signed on 20 December. Both 
parties have recognised the gas package deal as a compromise, while most of its provisions can be 
viewed as a success for Ukraine. Gazprom had to make concessions because it was Moscow which 
most needed a new transit agreement; without one it would not have been able to meet its con-
tractual obligations with regard to European clients. The European Commission-mediated talks were 
long and tough, due to the fundamentally different interests of the two parties. Ukraine wants to 
maintain its status of a major transit state, while Russia has been making consistent efforts to rely 
less and less on Ukrainian gas pipelines, such as pushing through the construction of Nord Stream 2 
and the finalisation of the TurkStream project in 2018. Obstacles to compromise included: a de facto 
military conflict between the two countries, legal disputes between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the on-
going reform of the Ukrainian gas sector and the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. 
The compromise will entail a new model of transit co-operation between the parties, which should 
ensure stability in this area until 2024. It is also possible that a contract covering direct supplies of 
Russian gas to Ukraine will be signed in the near future, since they were stopped in November 2015. 
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The expectedly long negotiations 
and their context
The deal is an effect of arduous negotiations which 
lasted for almost one and a half years. The talks 
were conducted predominantly in the trilateral 
format (Russia–Ukraine–European Union) as part 
of which meetings were held on political and 
technical levels. Several bilateral meetings were 
held in the final phase of the negotiations between 
representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian sides. 
Germany was also engaged in the negotiation 
process – Berlin was the venue of two out of the 
five trilateral rounds of the talks. Furthermore, the 
German government appointed a special pleni-
potentiary for Russian gas transit via Ukraine in 
August 2019. These issues were also consulted 
on a regular basis over the phone by Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel and President Vladimir Putin. 
The negotiation process was streamlined in the 
final phase primarily owing to the 9 December 
Paris meeting of the Ukrainian, Russian, French and 
German leaders as part of the Normandy Format 
talks devoted to resolving the Donbas conflict.
It was expected that the negotiation process would 
be long due to the rapidly changing political situa-
tion.1 On the one hand, the deadlock was an effect 
of the political calendar in Ukraine (the presidential 
elections were held in April and the parliamentary 
elections in July), and the Russian side made it 
clear on several occasions that any arrangements 
concerning gas issues could only be made after 
the election cycle was over. Another major factor 
was the progress in the implementation of Russian 
pipeline projects, which are being constructed 
in order to reduce Russia’s dependence on the 
Ukrainian transit route. TurkStream was complet-
ed in November 2018 (two branches with a total 
capacity of 31.5 bcm); and the construction of 
1 See more: S. Kardaś, A. Łoskot-Strachota, S. Matuszak, 
‘A ‘last-minute’ transit contract? Russia-Ukraine-EU gas 
talks’, OSW Commentary, no. 291, 25 January 2019, 
www.osw.waw.pl. 
Nord Stream 2 was launched in September 2018 
and was continued at breakneck speed in 2019 
(according to Gazprom’s data, over 93% of it has 
been laid so far). Finally, the US sanctions affecting 
the firms engaged in the construction of Nord 
Stream 2 (approved by President Donald Trump 
on 20 December) provided an important context 
for the final stage of the negotiations, which led 
to the construction work being stopped. However, 
it is difficult to determine the impact they had 
on the finalisation of the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
negotiations. 
Additionally, both Ukraine and the European re-
cipients of Russian gas, fearing a possible gas 
crisis should a new transit contract not be signed, 
increased the level of reserves in gas storages. Kyiv, 
preparing for the worst-case scenario, secured 
record-high gas reserves (almost 22 bcm). Even if 
imports westwards were discontinued, this would 
guarantee a safe heating season. Furthermore, 
the Ukrainian government and representatives 
of Naftogaz declared on numerous occasions 
that, were Gazprom not to agree to sign a new 
contract, Ukraine would begin treating the gas 
shipped via its territory as contraband and would 
stream it to its own gas tanks. European recipients 
also prepared for a potential gas crisis, proof of 
which is that their gas storages are 95–100% full.
What is the deal?
The agreements signed by the parties provide 
for the resolution of the key points of dispute 
concerning Russian-Ukrainian gas co-operation. 
Firstly, Naftogaz and Gazprom signed a five-year 
contract concerning Russian gas transit via Ukrain-
ian territory. The following transit volumes are 
envisaged under the contract: 65 bcm in 2020, 
and 40 bcm of gas annually in the next four years. 
As announced by the Ukrainian side, supplies will 
be based on the ship-or-pay formula (this formula 
imposes the obligation on Gazprom to pay for the 
transit of the contracted volumes of gas regardless 
of the actual transport volumes). In addition to 
this, the protocol of 20 December envisages the 
possibility of renewing the transit contract for 
The deal is an effect of arduous ne-
gotiations which lasted for almost 
one and a half years.
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a further ten years (2025–2034). At the same time, 
Gazprom signed an interconnection agreement 
with OGTSU. In turn, OGTSU signed the same kind 
of agreement with the Slovak, Polish, Hungarian 
and Romanian operators. 
Secondly, Gazprom repaid the US$2.92 billion 
debt to Naftogaz as ruled in the final arbitration 
awards passed in December 2017 (concerning the 
Russian-Ukrainian supply contract) and in Febru-
ary 2018 (concerning the transit contract) by the 
Stockholm Arbitration Court. Furthermore, both 
Naftogaz and Gazprom are obliged to withdraw 
from the new arbitration proceedings launched 
in 2018–2019 – this, in particular, concerns the 
Ukrainian claim of July 2018 for damages worth 
around US$12.3 billion for potential losses in case 
Gazprom discontinued gas transit via Ukraine due 
to the planned launch of alternative transport 
routes. Gazprom, in turn, withdrew its appeals 
against the final arbitration awards. Kyiv also 
decided to withdraw its claims resulting from the 
decision of the national anti-trust agency which 
in January 2016 imposed on Gazprom a fine of 
around US$7.3 billion for abusing its dominant 
position on the Ukrainian market. As part of the 
deal, Naftogaz also agreed to refrain from contin-
uing enforcement proceedings against Gazprom’s 
assets in Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom. 
What is not clear is the transit tariff (in 2019, Gaz-
prom used to pay US$2.61 for transporting 1,000 
cm of gas per 100 km-long section). According 
to the provisions of the protocol of 20 December, 
the tariff is to be competitive and correspond 
to the rates that apply in Central and Western 
Europe. The Russian side on numerous occasions 
pointed out during the negotiations that in order 
to continue transit via Ukraine, it must be cost-ef-
fective to Gazprom, i.e. cheaper than transport 
using alternative routes. Furthermore, it can be 
concluded from statements made by the directors 
of Naftogaz that a higher tariff will be applied 
to potential additional volumes (above the guar-
anteed minimum), and the tariff has not been 
precisely determined. 
Consequences for Ukraine
The Ukrainian side has managed to obtain a guaran-
tee that it will retain almost half of the present volume 
of Russian gas via its territory until 2024. Although 
this needs to be viewed as a success, transit incomes 
will inevitably fall to a significant degree (according to 
information from Ukrainian sources, they will reach 
a total of at least US$7.2 billion within the next five 
years). One of Ukraine’s key goals was to retain the 
highest volume possible of Russian gas transports 
to the West (in 2018 it was 86.8 bcm, and in 2019 
it was 89.6 bcm) for as long as possible because so 
far this has generated income of around US$3 billion 
annually. In this spirit, the European Commission’s 
put forward its initial proposal in January 2019 en-
visaging the signing of a 10-year transit contract, 
with a transit volume of at least 60 bcm annually.
However, following the launch of both branches 
of TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 at the end of 
2020) if Gazprom was able to use the new gas 
pipelines at full capacity, and demand for Russian 
gas remained at the present level, gas transport 
volumes might have been reduced to almost zero 
without a new transit contract. Thus the recently 
signed contract will extend the use of the system 
of transit gas pipelines for at least five years, 
with a guaranteed transport volume of 40 bcm, 
i.e. the minimum quality necessary to maintain 
the system’s profitability, according to Ukrainian 
calculations. At the same time, the deal does not 
guarantee that Gazprom will still transport gas via 
Ukrainian gas pipelines after 2024. Discontinuation 
of Russian gas transport would make it necessary 
to turn off a significant section of the system. It is 
important that the agreed conditions give Ukraine 
time to prepare for this and to adjust the size of 
the transport system to its own domestic needs.
A further success for Ukraine is the fact that the 
arbitration court ruled that Gazprom must pay 
US$2.9 billion in damages; this is of major signif-
The agreements signed by the par-
ties provide for the resolution of the 
key points of dispute concerning 
Russian-Ukrainian gas co-operation.
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icance for the Ukrainian budget. Since the begin-
ning, Ukraine has consistently rejected the Russian 
demands to withdraw from enforcing the debt 
and has only accepted the option of withdrawing 
the new suits which were brought to arbitration 
in July 2018.
Negotiations with Gazprom took place alongside 
the complex process of Naftogaz’s unbundling, 
which was an important part of the gas sector’s 
reform and a necessary condition to enable the 
signing of a new contract with Gazprom in com-
pliance with the EU rules. The Unbundling Act was 
passed by Ukraine’s parliament as late as 31 Octo-
ber and signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky 
on 15 November. In effect, a gas pipeline system 
was separated from Naftogaz and licences to 
operate the pipelines were granted for 15 years to 
OGTSU (a company 100% owned by Ukrtransgaz, 
a subsidiary of Naftogaz). Then, shares in OGTSU 
were handed over to the state-controlled company 
Mahistralni Gazoprovody Ukrayiny (MGU). The 
unbundling is in compliance with the principles 
of the so-called EU Third Energy Package. OGTSU 
was certified by the Energy Community on 17 De-
cember, which was confirmed by the European 
Commission on 27 December. The main effect of 
the unbundling is the fact that OGTSU assumed 
the responsibility for Russian gas transit starting 
from 1 January 2020.
Two Ukrainian companies, Naftogaz and OGTSU, 
are mentioned in the new co-operation terms 
set after negotiations with Gazprom. For a start, 
the Russian company will sign a contract with 
Naftogaz as a ‘gas transport organiser’ which 
will reserve transport capacity in the gas pipeline 
system with OGTSU. Direct transit functions will 
be performed by OGTSU, which will also sign 
a contract with Gazprom. The Russian side will 
pay the transit charges to Naftogaz on the basis 
of the previously agreed tariff. In turn, Naftogaz 
will settle accounts with the operator. It is unclear 
how this model will work in practice. Based on 
Russian statements, it was Gazprom who insisted 
on creating the model so that Naftogaz, which 
in essence became a dealer, took over the risks 
linked to the operation of Ukraine’s gas system 
once the unbundling was over. However, the new 
model seems to be beneficial also for Naftogaz, 
which will retain part of the profits generated by 
transit; to date these have accounted for almost 
half of its total income.
The last point of the protocol of 20 December 
provides for the option of signing a contract cov-
ering direct Russian gas supplies to Ukrainian 
recipients. This was Gazprom’s major goal from 
the beginning of the negotiations. At the same 
time, the Ukrainian government did not rule this 
out, expecting to be offered lower prices than it 
pays for gas supplied from the West. This is im-
portant from Kyiv’s viewpoint given the possibility 
of softening the blow of the gas price rise which 
will result from the liberalisation of gas prices for 
individual users and the public sector starting 
from 1 May 2020.
Russian concessions and benefits
The terms of the deal reveal that it was the Rus-
sian side who had to make more concessions in 
the final phase of the negotiations. Even though 
Moscow adopted increasingly tougher rhetoric 
throughout the talks and did not show a readiness 
to give up its demands, its negotiation position 
was in fact weaker. The absence of a transit con-
tract with Ukraine would have prevented Gaz-
prom from fulfilling its contractual obligations 
to numerous European recipients of Russian gas. 
In turn, this would have entailed not only serious 
reputational but also economic losses.
Firstly, Moscow has in fact recognised that Gaz-
prom owes an arbitration debt to Naftogaz even 
though representatives of the Russian side em-
phasised on numerous occasions in the earlier 
stages of the negotiations that Ukraine had to 
withdraw its arbitration claims or Russia would 
not agree to sign a new transit contract. This was 
Both parties have recognised the 
gas package deal as a compromise, 
while most of its provisions can be 
viewed as a success for Ukraine.
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the official stance in the last public version of the 
terms of a new agreement published by Gazprom 
on 25 November 2019. Secondly, Moscow insisted 
that in order for a new transit deal to be struck, it 
had to be accompanied by the signing of a new 
contract covering direct Russian gas supplies to 
Ukraine. This condition was put forward for the 
first time during the trilateral gas talks that were 
underway in January 2019. The signed protocol 
does not provide for any obligations to this ef-
fect—only the possibility of signing such a contract 
is envisaged, if the parties are interested. Thirdly, 
the basic parameters of the new transit deal dif-
fer from those proposed earlier by the Russian 
side. During the last phase of the negotiations, 
Gazprom proposed renewing the current transit 
contract or signing a new one for only one year. 
As regards the volumes, Gazprom’s representa-
tives suggested in April 2018 that it was possible 
to sign an agreement imposing the obligation to 
transport 10–15 bcm of gas.
However, the contracts also include solutions that 
are beneficial for Moscow. The agreed minimum 
Russian gas transit volumes are not a burden for 
Gazprom, although including the ship-or-pay 
clause in the contract is a certain concession (the 
protocol of 20 December did not provide for 
this). The Russian company would have to use 
the Ukrainian transport network for the next few 
years anyway to fulfil its contractual obligations 
with regard to European recipients. Launching the 
TurkStream gas pipeline in January 2020 allowed 
Gazprom to redirect relatively small quantities of 
gas currently transported via the Ukrainian route 
to Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and North Macedonia. 
However, it is unclear when the Russian company 
will be able to use the second branch of Turk-
Stream to its full extent. The time of the launch 
and the scale of supplies via the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline are also unknown. The finalisation of 
this project may be delayed due to the US sanc-
tions. Moreover, even once the pipeline is put 
into operation, the scope of its commercial use 
will be limited due to the restrictions imposed by 
the amendment of the Gas Directive adopted in 
April 2019. On top of that, the judgement passed 
by the General Court of the European Union in 
September 2019 annulling the European Commis-
sion’s decision concerning the OPAL gas pipeline 
forced the Russian company to reduce the volume 
of gas transport via Nord Stream 1 (the decision 
of 2016 envisaged exclusions of certain rules of 
the so-called Third Energy Package, thus enabling 
Gazprom to use Nord Stream 1 at full capacity). 
Nevertheless, the absence of the obligation to 
renew the contract after 2024 allows Gazprom 
to remain flexible in developing its medium- and 
long-term trade policy. Regardless of its present 
problems, the Russian company will finalise the 
Nord Stream 2 project within a five-year time-
frame. Most likely, infrastructure enabling the 
use of the second branch of TurkStream at full 
capacity will also be ready in European countries. 
What next?
Although the protocol of 20 December was a po-
litical document which did not impose any legal 
obligations, both parties have manifested their 
will to implement its provisions – the package 
of agreements signed are proof of this (only one 
day late according to the schedule included in 
the protocol). Everything appears to indicate that 
the new gas co-operation model will function to 
the end of 2024. If demand for Russian gas in Eu-
rope remains on the present level, transit volumes 
via Ukraine may be even higher in the coming 
years than envisaged in the contract because it is 
unclear whether Gazprom will be able to use the 
alternative transport routes at full capacity. Even 
though the Russian plans to stop using Ukrainian 
gas transit routes have been postponed for five 
years, it is uncertain whether Ukraine will retain 
its significance as a transit country after 2024.
The Russian plans to stop using 
Ukrainian gas transit routes have 
been postponed for five years, it 
is uncertain whether Ukraine will 
retain its significance as a transit 
country after 2024.
